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The Hundred Years War (1337-1453)
was a crucial period in the evolution of
European warfare. By the end of the
conflict, the traditional means by which
Europeans conducted warfare had
changed dramatically. The age of the
armored knight had essentially ended
and military gallantry was replaced with
practicality. The war ushered in a new
age of warfare; the reliance on feudal
levies diminished, making way for more
professionalized, standing armies. This
shift carried on into the early modern
era, which military historians have
categorized as a military revolution.
The military revolution thesis argues
that the emergence of professional,
wage based armies, as well as the rising
prominence of gunpowder weaponry
created an unparalleled period of
military innovation. Medieval military
historians have successfully linked the
Hundred Years War to the military
revolution thesis; however, the majority
of attention is given to the English. Their
initial reliance on paid infantry coupled
with an abundance of English centered
scholarship has made the English
connection to the military revolution
clearly defined. French military efforts are
discussed only in regard to Charles VII’s
military reforms that allowed the French
to win the war. While Charles VII’s
military reforms were an important piece
of the military revolution, the largely
unanalyzed period of French resurgence
during the reign of Charles V was just
as revolutionary. The reign of Charles
V, when France set aside traditional
medieval tactics, had a significant
influence not only on Charles VII’s
reforms, but the overarching evolution of
European warfare.
In 1955, historian Michael Roberts
introduced the idea of a military
revolution. Roberts’ idea of the military
revolution, characterized the early

modern era, particularly 1560-1660, as
a period of vast military change. As the
medieval period came to an end, new
weapons, tactics, and military systems
were adopted by European countries. Out
of the shadow of feudalism, professional,
wage based armies emerged. Unlike the
feudal armies of the medieval period,
early modern military systems were
formed on the idea that they would be
standing armies. Though the men who
composed these units may not have
been professional troops from time of
recruitment, prolonged enlistments
molded them into highly effective
and professional forces. According to
Roberts, armies of the early modern era
were unlike “ a collection of bellicose
individuals, in the feudal style; it was
to be an articulated organism of which
each part responded to the impulses
from above.”1 A centralized command
structure would prove far more effective
than a horde of feudal levies.
Geoffrey Parker, in his work The
Military Revolution, expanded the concept
previously introduced by Roberts. What
is particularly notable of Parker’s work is
the fact that he extended the revolution’s
reach. In his discussion of the increased
reliance on infantry in the early modern
era, Parker pays tribute to English archers
during the 14th and 15th centuries. During
the Hundred Years War, English archers
essentially dominated in pitched battles.
It was because of the reliance on missile
weapons such as the English longbow
during the latter medieval period that
handheld gunpowder weapons were so
attractive to early modern European
armies.2 Initial analysis of the Hundred
Years War, coupled with the reliance on
ranged weaponry, reveals that the English
were among the first European nations to
enter this period of military innovation.
Analogous to English strategy at Crécy
(1346) and Agincourt (1415), volley

1. Michael Roberts, Essays in Swedish History (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967), 198.
2. Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 16.
3. Ibid., 19.
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firing became a benchmark of European
warfare by the 16th century. These new
armies, including those who opposed
them, were required to spread themselves
out in order maximize the output of
fire and to reduce their own casualties.3
As seen in the English victories of the
Hundred Years War, those failing to take
the proper precautions against massed
missile fire were likely to meet disaster.
Among the most prominent analyses
of military change in the Hundred
Years War is Clifford J. Rogers’ “The
Military Revolutions of the Hundred
Years War.” Rogers argues that the
military significance of the Hundred
Years War can be attributed to two major
revolutions; the infantry revolution and
the artillery revolution. The infantry
revolution, according to Rogers, is a
concept adopted by the English; their
use of longbowmen allowed them to
dominate in pitched battles. Additionally,
Rogers argues that the enfranchisement of
men of lesser social status had large effects
on the level of battlefield carnage. This
large, wage based force, caring little for
the chivalric ways of their social superiors,
were much more likely to kill their enemy
as opposed to capturing him.4 This led
to tremendous numbers of casualties,
particularly among the French, whose
armies consisted mainly of feudal levies.
Rogers also states that the failure on part
of the French to produce an effective force
of archers led to many of their failures
throughout the war.5 According to him,
the French would not enter the sphere
of military revolution until the reign of
Charles VII, when they adopted massed
artillery.
Although artillery had been used
throughout the war, Rogers argues that
the artillery revolution truly manifested
itself during the later years of the war and
did so primarily in the French military.
By 1453, the French were spending
more than twice the money on artillery
compared to other facets of the military.

This remarkable investment in artillery
allowed French commanders to engage in
pitched battles with the English without
fear of being outgunned.6 The large
artillery train assembled by the French
proved deadly, especially at Castillon in
1453. The military doctrine of Charles
VII was one centered on artillery and
a large, professionalized standing army.
With his newly reformed military, Charles
effectively expelled the English from
France, bringing an end to the war.
Rogers successfully links the Hundred
Years War to the military revolution;
however, the period of French resurgence
in the latter half of the 14th century is
left undiscussed. This is likely due to the
small amount of scholarship dedicated
to the French. Far more material is
available from the English point of view;
this influx of Anglo-centric scholarship
makes the task of acknowledging French
military accomplishments during this time
difficult. With a lack of Franco-centric
scholarship, biases emerge. An example
of this can been seen in a discussion
about Bertrand du Guesclin, Constable of
France during the reign of Charles V. Du
Guesclin, who will later be discussed in
detail, carried out a guerrilla war against
the English. Dismissal of his tactics is
illustrated by French historian Edouard
Perroy, who categorized du Guesclin as a
“mediocre captain, incapable of winning
a battle or being successful in a siege of
any scope, just good enough to put new
life into the bands of pillaging routiers”7
While Perroy’s work on the Hundred
Years War is a useful guide in any study
of the war, a broad selection of source
material is needed to accurately support
the effectiveness of du Guesclin’s tactics.
The small amount of Franco-centric
scholarship makes it difficult to paint
an accurate picture of figures such as
du Guesclin, regardless of a particular
author’s nationality. In order to avoid
information gaps and cultural bias, a
variety of scholarship must be utilized.

The need for French military
reform was apparent from the first
major engagements. The opening stages
of the Hundred Years War proved
devastating for the French. The tenacity
of Edward III resulted in a resounding
victory at Crécy in 1346. Historians have
attributed Edward’s victory at Crécy
to his longbowmen. The longbow, a
bow stave nearly six feet long with 100
to 150 pounds of draw force, proved
deadly in the hands of a well-practiced
Englishman. When positioned in an
open field of battle, English longbowmen
inflicted heavy casualties against any
foe with the zeal to meet them head on.
Edward’s order of battle at Crécy on
August 26, 1346, consisted of two bodies
of longbowmen flanking a central force
of dismounted men at arms.8 The French
force under Philip VI, relying heavily
on the shock factor of a large force of
mounted knights, took heavy casualties
as they charged Edward’s position. These
tactics proved futile, for when the battle
was over, nearly 1,500 French knights lay
dead. 9 Crécy was a sign for both sides
that the war would not be brief and that
the traditional tactics of the mounted
knight were becoming obsolete.
With the momentum leaning in
favor of England, Edward, the Prince
of Wales, otherwise known as the Black
Prince, organized a series of raids in 1355
and 1356. His campaigns relied on a
strategy referred to as a chevauchée (literally
translated as cavalcade). The chevauchée
was a strategy which used the destruction
of farmlands, looting, rape, and murder
as a means of demoralizing French rural
populations and damaging their ability
to support an army.10 Edward’s grand
strategy proved more lucrative than any
Englishman could have imagined; apart
from the loot taken from French towns,
the English claimed yet another major
victory over the French. During the 1356
raid, a French force shadowed the Prince
of Wales, looking for the opportunity to

4. Clifford J Rogers. The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years’ War. The Journal of Military History 57, no. 2 (April 1993): 256.
5. Ibid., 251.
6. Ibid., 274.
7. Edouard Perroy, The Hundred Years War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), 148.
8. Jonathon Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 526-527.
9. Ibid., 528-530.
10. H.J. Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2004), 46.
11. Desmond Seward, The Hundred Years War: The English in France 1337-1453 (New York: Atheneum, 1978), 88-91.

47
VOLUME 19, 2015

avenge Crécy and the destruction of their
lands. The English army positioned itself
near the town of Poitiers and waited to
receive the French, led by King John II,
son of Philip VI. Unlike the French force
at Crécy, John’s army was almost entirely
dismounted. The battle commenced with
a French cavalry charge of 300 knights
who were given the task of eliminating
the English archers, enabling the infantry
to approach the English men at arms
unchallenged. The cavalry charge
ultimately failed and as a result, the
infantry attack took merciless fire from
the English flanks. As devastating as the
arrow fire was, the English struggled to
keep the numerically superior French at
bay. Fortunately for the Prince of Wales,
a force of 150 mounted men at arms and
archers under the Captal de Buch, hit the
French from behind. John’s army, thinking
the Captal’s troops were more numerous
than they actually were, retreated in
confusion.11 The battle of Poitiers was a
humiliating French defeat that resulted in
the capture of King John II. The simple
act of dismounting the army was far
from the military reform France required.
These tactical shortcomings allowed
the English to expand their holdings in
France to more than twice what they had
been prior to 1337. However, with John
II out of the picture, his son Charles took
control. Charles, unlike his predecessors,
knew how to neutralize the combat
effectiveness of an English army. It was
during his reign that France set aside the
chivalric ideals of medieval warfare and
began to fight a different war.
Edward III’s last campaign in 1359
saw the early stages of a new French
strategy. The campaign was an immense
logistical undertaking. Knowing that
the French countryside, particularly the
Champagne region, was devastated by
the conflict, Edward arranged a supply
train of over 1,000 wagons.12 Edward’s
10,000 man force set out from Calais on
November 4th 1359; less than two weeks

into the campaign, supplies dwindled. In
order for Edward to effectively maintain
his army, foraging became necessary;
however, the French Dauphin Charles
(who would later become Charles V)
made foraging increasingly difficult. In
his strategy to combat Edward’s advance,
Charles adopted a scorched earth policy.
At the command of the Dauphin, the
French countryside in the path of the
English army was abandoned and burned;
the citizens who lived in these areas were
ordered to take what supplies they could
carry and move into larger fortresses.
Supplies that the inhabitants could not
carry were burned, denying Edward’s
army the supplies they desperately
needed. The French populace lying in the
path of the English advance stayed within
the confines of fortresses. Additionally,
mounted troops were often sent forth from
the towns to harass English foragers.13
With this simple, yet prudent strategy,
Charles began to effectively neutralize
the English force. Without proper
supplies, Edward’s time in France became
increasingly limited, creating a dire need
for a tactical victory.
The need for logistical support
turned Edward’s grand campaign from
one of conquest to one of desperation.
From December 4, 1359 to January 11,
1360, Edward’s army encircled the city
of Rennes. Fortunately for the city’s
defense, Charles’ scorched earth policy
left the besiegers lacking in supplies.
Having failed to take the city by storm in
January, Edward was forced to retreat.14
Logistical deficiencies kept Edward’s army
relatively inactive until early March when
they moved toward the city of Paris in
hopes of forcing Charles to sue for peace.
On April 7, Edward’s army arrived just
south of Paris to find that the Parisians
had burned the southern suburbs of the
city and retreated behind the walls. For
several days, the English attempted to
draw the French army into the open; the
dauphin’s troops did not take the bait. On

April 12, after failing to bring the French
to battle, Edward withdrew from the city.
By the end of the month, Edward’s forces
had reached their breaking point, forcing
Edward to call a diplomatic meeting, one
which resulted in the treaty of Brétigny.15
Charles’ strategy had not only prevented
a disaster the likes of Crécy, it had also
birthed a period of French military
reform.
Though the English had not suffered
a devastating loss on the level of Crécy or
Poitiers, the invasion of 1359 was largely
a failure. The Dauphin Charles had
learned from the mistakes of his father
and grandfather. The scorched earth
policy Charles enacted took the initiative
away from the English who, due to their
difficulties in supplying large armies,
depended on foraging for survival. If
Crécy and Poitiers had taught the French
anything, it was that the current French
military system was unfit for open field
combat with English archers. While one
can attribute Charles’ unwillingness to
fight a pitched battle to a possible lack
of manpower following the disaster at
Poitiers, the effectiveness of his strategy
cannot be ignored. The English invasion
of 1359 proved that the French were
clearly capable of success as long as they
possessed a willingness to adapt. Although
Charles’ military doctrine was just
beginning to form during this time, it was
clear that under his authority, France had
a fighting chance.
The Treaty of Brétigny introduced a
period of peace as well as a new challenge
for the French monarch. The state of
the English economy was such that
maintaining a large standing army was
out of the question. Bands of unemployed
mercenaries who had previously fought
in English armies, known in France as
the routiers, wrought havoc amongst the
French populace. What made these “free
companies” particularly threatening
was the fact that they were professional
soldiers. Composed of English, Breton,

12. Jonathon Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Fire (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 425.
13. Ibid., 427
14. Ibid., 431
15. Sumption, Trial by Fire, 442-444.
16. Perroy, The Hundred Years War, 154.
17. Ibid., 155.
18. Seward, The Hundred Years War, 106.
19. Richard Vernier, The Flower of Chivalry: Bertrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2003), 21.
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Spanish, and German mercenaries, these
companies ran rampant through the
French countryside.16 The routiers made
their living in the exploitation of civilians;
their activities included kidnapping
French citizens for ransom, storming
towns and villages, selling safe passage
on the roads, as well as theft of food
supplies.17 The routiers also had a tendency
to form large groups known as the
“Grand Companies”. These companies
such as those led by the infamous Arnaud
de Cervole, the Archpriest, accrued large
amounts of wealth from the relentless
theft and murder of French civilians.
During the early 1360s, the French
government lacked the power to solve
the routier problem militarily. The absence
of a French response forced lords to pay
these companies off in order to prevent
the destruction of their property. Other
than a crusade against the Turks that
never materialized, few efforts were made
to rid France of the routiers.18 Luckily for
Charles, the year 1365 presented him with
an opportunity to solve the problem of
the companies. Rather than attempting
the laborious task of quelling the routiers
by force, Charles incorporated them into
the expeditionary force sent to the Iberian
Peninsula to fight a war of succession
in Castile. The man who led this army
thrived in the warfare style of the routiers;
his name was Bertrand du Guesclin.
Du Guesclin, unlike the common
French lord, was not born into gallantry.
The only surviving record of his
childhood shows that his parents wished
him dead, for he was an especially
ugly child.19 An outsider from birth, du
Guesclin found solace in warfare and
violence. Rising to prominence during
the Breton Civil War, du Guesclin
proved that he was more than capable of
effectively fighting the English. One of

the most notable of Bertrand’s exploits
during this time was performed during
the siege of Rennes in 1342. The Englishheld city was retaken by du Guesclin in
a manner uncustomary to the chivalric
ways of the time. Posing as woodcutters,
du Guesclin and his men were admitted
into the city. Upon entry du Guesclin
and the accompanying force dispatched
the English garrison.20 This Trojan horse
style of fighting exemplified du Guesclin’s
military ethos. Throughout the early
stages of his military career, du Guesclin
made a name for himself as a guerrilla
fighter. It was only fitting that Charles V,
whose military practices in 1359 reflected
this asymmetrical warfare, went to him for
assistance in ridding France of the routiers.
War between England and France
perpetuated well beyond the boundaries
of the two respective countries. In the
latter half of 1365, civil war erupted in
the Iberian country of Castile. France had
been on good terms with the Castilians
until Charles V’s sister- in- law Blanche
de Bourbon, wife to the unfaithful King
Pedro of Castile, died by mysterious
circumstances. To deteriorate relations
further, Pedro (often referred to as Pedro
the Cruel) signed a treaty, aligning himself
with King Edward III.21 The French
would seek recompense for the death
of Blanche de Bourbon, the demise of
Pedro, and the accession of Enrique de
Trastamara, an illegitimate son of Pedro
I’s father, to the throne. In support of
Enrique, Charles V ordered du Guesclin
to organize an army of routiers for an
expedition into Castile. The routiers
composing this force included many from
the Breton region, men who had fought
against du Guesclin during the Breton
Civil War. Additionally, those who either
occupied fortresses or were likely going
to remain in France, were chosen for

this army. With the addition of a small
number of French knights, du Guesclin’s
army numbered nearly 12,000 men.22 The
recruitment of the routiers not only relieved
Charles V of a great headache, it also put
du Guesclin at the head of an army of
professional soldiers.
The professional nature of the
routiers was not the sole characteristic
that separated them from the traditional
Feudal levies that fought the English
at Crécy and Poitiers. Similar to the
armies fielded by Edward III and the
Black Prince, the routiers were wage based
troops. In order to effectively bring them
under an appropriate level of control, du
Guesclin organized a system of payment.
This task seems to be one to which he
was well suited; according to popular
legend, du Guesclin was very successful
in acquiring payment from Charles V
for these troops.23 His ability to acquire
payment for this routier force was a large
factor in the army’s success. Du Guesclin’s
correspondence shows that he was in fact
successful in acquiring money from the
French monarch for this army:
A touz ceuls qui ces presentes lettres
verront, Bertran du Guerclin, chevalier,
conte de Longueville, chambellan du Roy
de France, mon tresredoubté et souverain
seigneur, salut. Savoir faisons que parmi
certaine somme de derniers que le dit roy
mon souverain seigneur nous a pieca fait
bailler en prest, tant pour mettre hors de
son royaume les compaignies qui estoient
es parties de Bretaigne, de Normandie
et de Chart[r]ain et ailleurs es basses
marches….24
The money allocated by Charles
allowed du Guesclin to recruit the
larger, more organized groups of these
companies from various areas throughout
France. By the end of 1365, du Guesclin
and his army of routiers departed for

20. Vernier, The Flower of Chivalry, 43.
21. Ibid., 84.
22. Sumption, Trial by Fire, 529-530.
23. Vernier, The Flower of Chivalry, 89.
24. Michael Jones, ed., Letters, Orders and Musters of Bertrand du Guesclin, 1357-1380 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2004), 40-41. Translation: To all whom
these letters will be presented, Bertrand du Guesclin, Count of Longueville, Chamberlain of the King of France, my most my most respected and sovereign lord,
salutations. Be it known that this sum of money from the king my sovereign lord has been advanced to send out of his kingdom the companies from parts of
Brétigny, Normandy, the Chartrain, and other areas…
25. Vernier, The Flower of Chivalry, 90.
26. Sumption, Trial by Fire, 533.
27. Jones, Letters Orders and Musters of Bertrand du Guesclin, 55.
28. Vernier, The Flower of Chivalry, 96.
29. Vernier, The Flower of Chivalry, 106.
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Spain. The brutal nature of the routiers
made it impossible to completely
eliminate their violent tendencies as they
moved south; however, there was no large
scale destruction of towns or villages
as seen prior to their recruitment into
the French military.25 As the campaign
progressed, it became increasingly evident
that the prospect of payment was the only
true shield against their fury.
The brutal nature of the routiers
required a nearly constant flow of
payment. Though the prospect of wages
kept a large amount of the companies
invested in the campaign, their destructive
nature could not be completely controlled.
The army entered Spain through the
French allied kingdom of Aragon, then
ruled by King Peter IV; the 12,000 man
force was the largest army that had
entered Iberia in over a hundred years.26
In order to keep the level of destruction
under control, Peter IV contributed vast
amounts of money to du Guesclin’s army.
On one particular occasion in February
of 1366, Peter authorized a large
payment to one of du Guesclin’s esquires
in order to prevent the destruction of
the modern-day city of Huesca.27 The
conduct of the routier army imposed a
significant time restraint on du Guesclin
for neither the French nor the kingdom
of Aragon could afford to keep the routiers
under one banner forever. Fortunately,
once the campaign to place Henry of
Trastamara on the throne began in
late February in 1366, things came to a
rather swift conclusion. After little more
than a month, the campaign concluded
and Enrique of Trastamara was made
King of Castile. Du Guesclin’s army had
encountered little resistance, likely due
to the horrific reputation of the routiers.28

The French success in Castile in 1366 was
largely due to the ability of du Guesclin
and his allies to supply the army with
wages. Though rather unorthodox, this
professional force achieved far more than
the French feudal levies of Crécy and
Poitiers.
As successful as du Guesclin and
his army of routiers had been in 1366,
the following year brought new troubles.
Pedro I had survived the exploits of
1366 and sought out an alliance with
the English, hoping to reclaim Castile.
As a result of the pact with Pedro, the
English recalled the routiers back into
service, threatening the confiscation of
any holdings in England if they refused.29
Without the professional army at his
back, du Guesclin and his Castilian
allies suffered a defeat at the battle of
Nájera on April 2, 1367. Du Guesclin
was captured by the Black Prince and
remained in captivity until late 1369.
The Prince of Wales, having once again
recruited the men of the free companies,
turned the tide of the conflict in favor of
Pedro I. However, the English war effort
required the constant flow of funds.30
Pedro I had promised to fund the Black
Prince’s expedition but was unable to
acquire proper funding. This lack of
reimbursement forced the Black Prince
to tax his French holdings in Aquitaine;
the English campaign in Spain had been
an economic failure.31 In 1369, after
English support had been withdrawn,
Pedro I was cornered by Enrique and
the recently released du Guesclin at the
castle of Montiel where he was killed by
Enrique himself.32 The ultimate triumph
of Enrique de Trastamara, despite the
unfortunate setback that was Nájera, was
not only another success for Charles V,

but the beginning of a French resurgence.
The English financial debacle in
Castile provided Charles V with the
perfect opportunity to begin the task of
reclaiming southwestern France. The
Castilian expedition had cost both the
English and the French a large amount
of treasure, but the French allies were
far more financially accommodating
than Pedro I. As a result of Pedro’s
failure to deliver on his promises, the
Black Prince looked to his lands in
France for tax revenue. The Prince of
Wales implemented a hearth tax upon
his holdings in Aquitaine. Naturally,
his subjects were infuriated at the idea
of paying for a campaign that yielded
little financial gain.33 Despite the treaty
of Brétigny, inhabitants of the Prince’s
holdings began to flock to Charles with
appeals. The Black Prince was summoned
to Paris in January 1369 to answer for this
unjust tax. The reply Charles received
was “Sirs, we will gladly go to Paris, but
I assure you that it shall be with helmet
on our head and 60,000 men.”34 The
insolence of the Black Prince, coupled
with a refusal to strike down the hearth
tax, resulted in the renewing of the war in
June 1369.
If recent French military doctrine
was any indication, one could ascertain
that the French would certainly fight
differently than they had prior to John
II’s capture in 1356. Charles V’s new
strategy needed a commander, one
who was proven in guerrilla warfare. In
1370, Charles appointed du Guesclin
Constable of France.35 The appointment
of du Guesclin was but a piece of
Charles V reform of the French military.
The Castilian affair had shown how
effective an army could be if the troops

30. Seward, The Hundred Years War, 107.
31. Gordon Corrigan, A Great and Glorious Adventure: A History of the Hundred Years War and the Birth of Renaissance England (New York: Pegasus Books,
2014), 176.
32. Jean Froissart, Chronicles, trans. Geoffrey Brereton (London: Penguin Books, 1968), 173.
33. Vernier, The Flower of Chivalry, 148.
34. Seward, The Hundred Years War, 110.
35. Corrigan, A Great and Glorious Adventure, 177.
36. Jones, Letters, Orders and Musters of Bertrand du Guesclin, 142. Translation: Bertrand du Guesclin, duke of Molines, Constable of France, to our friend Etienne
Braque, treasurer of wars of the king or his lieutenant, salutations. We send this enclosed under our seal; 1,135 men at arms we selected to serve the king our lord
in these present wars under our authority, of which there are four knights banneret, 51 knights, and 1,080 men at arms received by us in Paris on January 1, 1370.
If you will please quickly send the payment in an appropriate manner. Given under our seal beginning on the above mentioned date. The Constable
37. Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages: Volume II 1278-1485 (New York: Burt Franklin, 1924), 198.
38. Seward, The Hundred Years War, 111.
39. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 198-199.
40. Jonathon Sumption, The Hundred Years War Part III: Divided Houses (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 75.
41. David Nicolle, The Great Chevauchée: John of Gaunt’s Raid on France 1373 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011), 22.
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were provided with monetary incentive.
Rather than maintaining an army by
feudal means, the French soldiers under
the constable were paid. Du Guesclin
successfully maintained this small,
professional French force, with money
allocated by the French government:
Bertrand du Guesclin, duc de
Molines, connestable de France, à nostre
amé Estienne Braque, thresorier des
guerres du Roy nostre sire ou à son
lieutenant, salut. Nous vous envoions
enclose sous nostre scel du secret le
monstre de onze cent trente et cinq
homes d’armes, lesquels nous avons
retenus pour server le Roy nostre sire
en ces presentes guerres sous nostre
gouvernement, dont il y a quatre
Chevaliers Bannerets, cinquante et un
Chevaliers Bacheliers, et mil quatre vingt
Escuiers de nostre compaignie reçeus
par nous à Paris le i. jour de Janiver 1’an
1370. Si vous mandons que pour toutes
lesdites gens vous nous faciez prest et
payement de leurs gages en la manière
qu’il appartiendra. Donnè audit lieu sous
nostre secret 1’an et jour dessus dit. Par
mons, le Connestable36
This system of pay allowed du
Guesclin to maintain a standing and
well-disciplined army composed of
French soldiers. The fact that these
troops were recruited for long term
use as opposed to a brief campaign,
implies that they embodied a level of
military professionalism similar to the
armies of the military revolution. With
this small, exclusive fighting force, du
Guesclin implemented a strategy that was
ultimately successful in turning the tide
against England.
Du Guesclin would conduct warfare
reminiscent to what the French had done
during Edward III’s 1359 campaign.

This strategy, commended by English
historian Sir Charles Oman, involved the
familiar willingness to sacrifice French
lands.37 This strategy proved effective
once again in the summer of 1369 and
in 1370 when two consecutive raids
were conducted by Sir Robert Knollys
and John of Gaunt. Both men achieved
relative success in destroying French lands;
however, the reluctance of Charles V to
give battle prevented any major gains.38
Despite the reluctance to give battle, du
Guesclin’s strategy was far from defensive.
Rather than meeting the English in a
pitched battle, du Guesclin and his band
of professional soldiers, conducted a
guerrilla war. His policy included quick
assaults on small garrisons, night attacks,
and raids on English supply lines. Above
all, du Guesclin would refuse battle with
the English even if he held a numerical
advantage.39 Du Guesclin knew that
England could not maintain a war with an
enemy that could not be brought to battle;
therefore attrition was key. He, along with
other French commanders, was able to do
this by moving quickly and maintaining
strict discipline amongst small bodies
of troops.40 Perhaps the most notable
instance of this strategy at work was the
1373 raid of John of Gaunt.
The largest invasion during this
period of the war was John of Gaunt’s
raid of 1373 which saw the full effect of
Charles V’s military doctrine. John of
Gaunt, the third son of King Edward III,
intended to lead a large force from Calais
to the beleaguered English holdings of
Aquitaine in southwestern France.41 John
of Gaunt’s force of 5,000 to 8,000 men,
divided into three columns, departed
the city of Calais on August 4, 1373.
Strangely, they did not travel directly
south but instead traveled southeast
around Paris through the Champagne
region. Though they had wrought a

notable level of destruction upon the
French countryside, they were failing
to lure French commanders into open
battle.42 Reminiscent of Edward III’s
1359 campaign, the French populace was
ordered to remain inside walled cities; the
advice of French commanders to Charles
V was to “Let them go on. They cannot
rob you of your heritage with fires and
smoke. They will grow tired and crumble
away to nothing.”43 By early September,
after nearly a month of raiding, John
of Gaunt was still on the move, but had
failed to bring the French out into the
open.
The raid began to truly decline when
the English reached the city of Troyes on
the 21st of September. John of Gaunt’s
army devastated the outlying area of the
city while the French remained behind
the walls. After failing to force the French
into battle before the walls of the city,
the English moved into the suburbs to
attack. As the English proceeded, the
French garrison launched a counterattack
that claimed a number of English lives
(estimates range from 120 to 600).44
To make matters worse, the western
column of the army (the English force
had reformed into two columns by this
time) was ambushed on September 27th.
Though the French largely avoided battle
during the raid, contingents of French
cavalry shadowed the English advance
south. The trap was set by French
commander Olivier de Clisson near the
city of Sens. A small force of 200 French
cavalry was positioned nearly a mile away
from the main French force of nearly
1,500 men near Sens. In pursuit of the
retreating cavalry, the English ran into de
Clisson’s main body and suffered nearly
600 casualties.45 Clisson’s ambush was
the most devastating loss for the English
during the raid and was irrefutable
evidence that John of Gaunt was failing
his mission.
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As with Edward III’s expedition
in 1359, it was obvious that an English
army conducting such a long campaign
in France would rely on foraging for the
acquisition of food and other supplies.
In early October, the French populace
near Avallon were ordered to bring all
food supplies into walled cities as well as
deconstruct mills in order to deny their
use by the English.46 In addition to the
shortage of food supplies, the French
were still in pursuit of the English as they
crossed the Loire and Allier rivers. In
order to maintain distance, the English
left their entire baggage train at the bank
of the Allier. The loss of the baggage
train came at the worst possible time, for
the English force continued on through
the winter months in territory with few
inhabitants and bereft of food.47 By the
time the expedition reached Bordeaux
on Christmas Eve of 1373, most of
the horses had died. Many of the men
entered the city without mounts or
armor.48 John of Gaunt’s great raid,
covering nearly 900km of French
countryside had been a monumental
failure. The failure of the Chevauchée, due
largely to the unwillingness of the French
to fight an open battle, proved once
again that English tactics reminiscent of
the Crécy and Poitiers campaigns were
ineffective against Charles V’s France.
Charles V, along with commanders
such as Bertrand du Guesclin had by
1374 reduced English holdings to what
they had been previous to the battle of
Crécy in 1346. Looking back on the
Crécy and Poitiers campaigns, it is clear
that the French were capable of victory.
English tactics during Charles V’s reign
were largely identical to what they were
when the war began; however, the lack
of a centralized command structure
under Philip VI and John II prevented
wise tactical decisions from being made.
This period of French resurgence was

due to Charles V and du Guesclin’s
ability to recognize the failures of their
predecessors and adapt. Their tactics,
though considered “the direct antithesis
of combat for honor”49 were effective in
bringing about French victory.
The French had made a tremendous
comeback; however hostilities continued
through the 1370s. These included
the 1377 French raids on the English
homeland. A period of French naval
dominance was initiated by the naval
victory of La Rochelle in late June
1372 where a large allied Castilian fleet
defeated an English fleet under the Duke
of Pembroke.50 During the years following
La Rochelle, French naval efforts grew;
along with a large requisition of merchant
ships for conversion, the Clos des Galées
at Rouen launched over forty warships
between 1376 and 1377.51 Along with
this newly christened fleet, French naval
officer Jean de Vienne took control
of naval affairs with the purpose of
maintaining French control of the English
Channel. During the summer months of
1377, the Franco-Castilian fleet raided
the English coast, burning villages and
claiming plunder until they were repelled
by English forces at Southampton.52 This
strategy, although not as successful as
the chevauchées of the Black Prince, was
an undeniable sign that the tables had
turned. English endeavors during the
latter 1370s included a failed chevauchée
by the newly crowned Richard II’s uncle
the Duke of Buckingham who, like John
of Gaunt, failed to bring the French to
battle.53 The hostilities came to a close in
1389 when a truce was signed; though it
was only meant as a temporary halt to
the war, no major campaigns would be
conducted until late 1415 when Henry V
reignited the war.
As heroic as this period of French
resurgence is, military revolution theorists
tend to dismiss the military doctrine of

Charles V and du Guesclin. Why is this?
Surely the tactics of Charles V and the
preference toward a professional force
rather than a feudal one fit into the
larger military revolution. The easiest
explanation for this dismissal lies within
Henry V’s victory at Agincourt in 1415.
What overshadows the late 14th century
changes in French military policy is not
the fact that Agincourt was an English
victory, but that the French essentially
abandoned Charles V’s military ideals
and reverted to tactics that had failed
them at Crécy and Poitiers. The battle of
Agincourt would have never happened
during the reign of Charles V, but his time
had ended and so had French dominance.
Henry V landed in France in August
1415 and besieged the city of Harfleur
between August 18 and September
22. The siege of Harfleur, which had
taken far longer than Henry had hoped,
was hardly a worthy prize for such a
momentous campaign; Henry wanted
more. Despite the fact that the army had
suffered tremendous losses both from the
fighting and dysentery, Henry decided
to take his ragged army on a chevauchée
toward the English garrison of Calais.54
During the long trek, the French army
marched parallel to Henry’s force as they
sought a crossing of the Somme. Using
tactics similar to John of Gaunt’s raid in
1373, the French pursued the English,
making river crossings difficult.55 French
maneuvering prevented large scale
destruction as Henry marched; however,
on October 25th, previous tactical doctrine
was tossed aside as the French accepted
an open field challenge.
The battle of Agincourt is considered
one of England’s greatest victories.
Estimates for the English strength vary
from 5,000 to 8,000 while the French
numbered an estimated 30,000. Similar
to the English Crécy and Poitiers, Henry’s
army was positioned with men at arms
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in the center with a wing of archers on
each flank. Abandoning all tactics of the
du Guesclin era, the French commenced
their attack with a cavalry charge as they
had done over sixty years earlier at Crécy.
Over 1,000 mounted knights charged the
English lines in hopes of cutting down
the longbowmen and were subsequently
shot down.56 Following the failed cavalry
attack, the main French attack came in
the form of dismounted men at arms.
Thousands of heavily armored French
knights, in a manner reminiscent of
John II’s main attack at Poitiers, trudged
through the muddy field over the bodies
of their dead comrades, all while taking
constant arrow fire from the English
flanks. By the time the attack reached
the English center, the French knights
were exhausted; they had little chance
against the English men at arms who had
simply waited for their approach.57 The
only French success at Agincourt was an
attack made on the English baggage train.
However, evidence shows that the attack
was made by lowly thieves rather than
armored knights, for the French could not
spare them. Henry’s lines were in no way
compromised by the raid on the baggage,
which accomplished little more than
the theft of some of the king’s personal
belongings.58 Agincourt was a disaster for
the French army; their losses numbered
nearly 10,000 with over 1,500 taken
prisoner while English losses totaled no
more than 500.59 Agincourt was a failure
on the part of the French command to
maintain the discipline that had been
learned during Charles V’s reign. As a
result of this setback, the English would
have the upper hand for the next decade.
Agincourt inaugurated a period
of English dominance; by 1420, the
English had claimed the throne of France,
accomplishing what Edward III had set
out to do nearly a century before. On
May 19, 1420, the Treaty of Troyes was
signed. The treaty recognized Henry as
the heir of King Charles VI, while the
dauphin (Charles VII) lost his claim.60
Henry V’s victory at Agincourt and
acquisition of the French throne, muddled
French military accomplishments during

Charles V’s reign. Why did the French
combat Henry’s army at Agincourt with
tactics that had proved so disastrous
against Edward III and the Prince of
Wales? Why did they give battle at all?
The answer to this question lies within the
simple fact that Charles V had essentially
ended the war. As mentioned previously,
English holdings had been reduced to
what they had been before Edward III’s
first successful invasion.61 Despite a few
raids conducted by both sides, the fighting
would not be reignited in earnest until
Henry’s invasion in 1415. There was no
need to expend large amounts of time
and treasure implementing a new military
doctrine during peacetime. As a result
of this hiatus, Charles V’s tactics faded
from memory. By the time the war began
anew, the French, now fractured by civil
war and under the ineffective leadership
of Charles VI, reverted to what they
knew best, traditional feudalism. Though
the French had abandoned Charles V’s
military policies, the suffering wrought by
Henry V was only temporary. The French
would once again rise and a military
doctrine similar to that of Charles V’s
would emerge.
The year 1429 initiated a period of
resurgence for the French. The French
dauphin, Charles VII, was approached
by a young woman from Lorraine who
claimed to be sent by God to relieve
the French city of Orléans on the Loire
River. The young woman, Jeanne
d’Arc, broke the siege of Orléans rather
quickly; conducting all out assaults on
the English defenses rather than setting
up for a prolonged encirclement.62 In
July of 1429, Jeanne and her army had
successfully reached the city of Reims
where Charles VII was crowned king of
France. Jeannes’s success, however great,
was to be short-lived; during the siege of
Compiegne in 1430, Jeanne was captured
by the Burgundians and soon sold to and
executed by the English.63 As tragic as
Jeanne’s death was, it was not a major
detriment to the French war effort, for
under Charles VII, France would soon
claim the final victory.
The reign of Charles VII brought

about a new age for the French military.
The military reforms enacted by Charles
were key factors to the French end
game. Among these changes was the
military reform of 1439; this reform
or “Ordonnance” enacted a military
system based on paid, professional troops.
Unlike the English soldiers of the war
who were released from service at the
end of a campaign, the new French army
was to be maintained both in time of
war and peace.64 The new military was
divided into what were known as the
Compagnies d’ordonnance; the men of
these companies were experienced soldiers.
Like the routiers, these companies had the
tendency to cause havoc throughout the
French countryside; however, a system
of monthly payment was arranged to
keep up moral standards and discipline.65
Artillery was also a major component
of Charles VII’s military reform and as
Rogers expresses, a crucial component
in the final stages of the Hundred Years
War. What made this large adoption of
gunpowder weaponry unique was the fact
that a large number of artillery pieces
were being brought together. Additionally,
artillery officers were appointed, such as
Jean and Gaspard Bureau, who ensured a
level of professionalism amongst French
artillerists.66 The French artillery train,
coupled with professional artillerists won
the final victory on July 16, 1453 at the
battle of Castillon. The battle began when
English Lord John Talbot led an attack on
a French force near Castillon. After forcing
a part of the French army to retreat,
Talbot ordered an attack on a nearby
French artillery park where a large number
of guns had been arranged. As the English
approached the park, the French cannon
inflicted devastating losses on the English
who were soon defeated. By the end of
1453, the English held only a sliver of land
near the city of Calais.67 Charles VII’s
military reforms had successfully ended the
war.
Charles VII’s military system, besides
the massed artillery, bears a strong
resemblance to the armies under Charles
V and du Guesclin. A significant difference
between these two systems is the level
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of credit ascribed to them. Historians find
it difficult to consider du Guesclin and
Charles V’s era as part of a larger military
evolution because of Henry V’s successes
and the French failure to permanently
adopt Charles V’s military policies.
Rogers’ discussion of Charles VII’s
adoption of massed artillery is likely due
to the fact that they were a large part of
the final French victory and subsequently
a much more visible example of a larger
progression in European warfare. Despite
this fact, one cannot ignore the similarities
that Charles VII’s military doctrine
bears to that of his grandfather. Without
Charles V’s military doctrine, Charles VII
would have had no model to follow, and
as a result, his military reforms may have
been quite different.
The Hundred Years War brought
about many military changes one can
accurately attribute to Roberts’ military
revolution. The wealth of Anglo-centric
scholarship illustrates a clear relationship
between the English military system and
the military revolution while a much less
diverse pool of sources makes French
military change far less defined. Through
careful analysis, it becomes increasingly
clear that French military innovation
throughout the latter half of the 14th
century can be accurately categorized
as revolutionary. The guerrilla tactics
of Charles V and Bertrand du Guesclin
paired with their preference towards
wage-based troops were successful in
rendering English tactics useless.
Additionally, they promoted a level
of military professionalism that largely
prevented the failures of Philip VI and
John II from being repeated. Though
these ideals were not carried over to
the early 15th century, Charles VII’s
military reforms, largely reflecting his
grandfather’s military ethos, allowed
France to claim the final victory. The
overarching influence of Charles V’s
military ideals earns him a rightful place
in the military revolution.
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